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RESPONSE
In our Spring 1987 issue of Consensus we invited readers to
respond to the “Perspectives on Evangelicalism/Fundamental-
ism/Neo-Conservatism” that were put forward by the various
LTS professors. There were many affirmative verbal responses,
but to date we have received only one written response. It
comes from Wayne Turner. Mr. Turner, who brings a strong
background in philosophy to his M.T.S. studies at our Sem-
inary in Saskatoon, finds some logical fallacies in the argu-
mentation; he argues that the incorporation of these fallacies
confuses the issue and keeps the authors from being able “to
assess the relative merits of each position.” We hope this con-
tribution will help to clarify the debate and keep the discussion
alive.
John W. Kleiner
Lutheran Theological Seminary, Saskatoon
A Perspective on Perspectives:
A Response to the
Spring 1987 Issue of Consensus
W. R. Turner
M.T.S. Student
Lutheran Theological Seminary, Saskatoon
In the Foreword to the Spring 1987 issue of Consensus^
John Kleiner notes that the subject chosen for consideration
—
evangelicalism/fundamentalism /neo-conservatism— “remains
somewhat elusive” and that “the essays are not all written
from the same perspective.” Here “perspective” means points
of view that either disapprove of or support the religious phe-
nomena in question. However, to offer a perspective entails not
only the judgment upon the truth or importance of the sub-
ject in question, but also a clear exposition of the point of view
which is judging the subject matter. It is this latter element
that is conspicuously absent in most of the articles.
Unfortunately, this absence facilitates, on the one hand, the
deployment of fallacious arguments and, on the other hand,
prevents the self-reflection necessary for participation in gen-
uine dialogue. In the first case, both R. Nostbakken and W.
Freitag commit a genetic fallacy^ when they argue that one
can account for a religious phenomenon by reducing it to its
sociological or psychological matrix. By assuming a strong
causal nexus between social circumstances and psychological
tendencies an attempt is made to explain away the arguments
of neo-conservatism without engaging them. However, the so-
cial conditions of desperation, anxiety, and skepticism shape
both conservatism, with its simplistic worldview, legalism, and
charismatic leadership, and liberalism, with its emphasis on
ambiguity, struggle and uncertainty; thus both are children of
the same social situation—twentieth century North America.
Consequently, it is impossible to determine which movement is
more determined, reactive, authentic, or true.
In the second case, the unwillingness to articulate one’s
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own theological position obscures the point that both con-
servatism and liberalism received their theological trajectories
from a confrontation with the liberal paradigm of knowledge,
2
a paradigm that is in the process of being dismantled. ^ Given
the historical absence of fruitful discussion between “conser-
vative” and “liberal” Christianity, one wonders if the shrill
tones and exasperated responses on both sides do not reflect
an allegiance to a common philosophical framework. That is,
both sides hold with the liberal paradigm of knowledge that
knowledge claims must be based on indubitable, incontrovert-
ible, and self-evident foundations. They disagree, however, on
particular claims which aspire to that status.
Let us consider two statements made by R. Nostbakken and
W. Freitag. Nostbakken says that “it is important for us to
try and gain some understanding of why a particular emphasis
or thrust has a special appeal in a given historical period.”^
Freitag surmises that there are those who “find it utterly nec-
essary to satisfy an unquenchable thirst for certitude in the
faith,” and asks, “what is it in the psychological makeup of
such persons that accounts for such a need?”^ However, one
can also ask what is the special appeal of Platonism, Newto-
nianism, and Darwinism, in their respective historical periods.
Further, one can also ask for a psychological account of Plato’s,
Luther’s, Descartes’, and Newton’s desire for certainty. But it
is, of course, another thing to assess the relative merits of each
position. And it is another thing yet to argue against certainty
as the mark of truth.
To complicate the picture even more one can also point out
that certainty as the mark of truth is an intuition that nec-
essarily arises out of the prevalence of the liberal paradigm of
knowledge or what secular authors call “foundationalism.” R.
Bernstein writes that the “disease” which characterizes con-
temporary thought is the result of a basic conviction about
knowledge. Bernstein calls this basic conviction “objectivism,”
that is, “that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical
matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in de-
termining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality,
goodness, or rightness.”® Such a belief is motivated by what
Bernstein calls Cartesian Anxiety: “Either there is some sup-
port for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or
w'e cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelope us with
madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.”
^
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It is important to note that Bernstein is not claiming in-
sight into the social conditions that spawned the psychological
reality of Cartesian Anxiety; rather, he is claiming that the
notion that nothing is true unless it is eternal, immutable,
absolute, and certain, is a notion ubiquitous to almost all con-
temporary intellectual discourse. Here we see exactly how neo-
conservatives are trapped by the twentieth-century straight-
jacket of rationalism to which E. Buck refers.®
But the question is, does liberal theology as an alterna-
tive perspective escape this straightjacket? For example, one
of the so-called dogmas of empiricism, the analytic-synthetic
distinction,® is the basis for the difference between necessary
and contingent truths. Traditionally, one of the arguments
against grounding faith in historical evidence is that such evi-
dence is always approximate, hence, contingent. Both Lessing
and Kierkegaard had nothing but disdain for the “ugly ditch”
that separated the “accidental truths of history” from the “nec-
essary truths of reason.” Michalson writes:
The Lessing-Kierkegaard view of faith’s relation to historical re-
search hzis dominated the mainstream of protestant thought in this
century, shaping the major theological responses to the growing dif-
ficulties posed by historical criticism and by the obvious problematic
relationship in which faith stands to modern biblical research.^®
Thus, Michalson accounts for Neo-Orthodoxy’s rejection of
the search for the historical Jesus as “theologically irrelevant.”
Bultmann’s distinction between “Historie” and “Geshichte”
and his disdain for the “bloss historisch,” and H.R. Niebuhr’s
invocation of the confessional “inner history” as a domesti-
cation of the “nagging problem of historical relativism,” are
classic examples manifesting the “Kierkegaardian view toward
history.” However, Quine, Heidegger, Kuhn, Foucault, and
others, have pointed out that notions of necessity are of-
ten just deeply ingrained linguistic habits, thus, blurring the
analytic-synthetic distinction and undermining the necessary-
contingent distinction. Consequently, not only have the above
theological distinctions become unnecessary, so has the need
to verify the historical credibility of the Bible through theories
of inspiration and inerrancy, or to appeal to the distinction
between the historical Jesus and the Christ of the kerygma.
There are, of course, other examples of seemingly op-
posed theological positions trading on the same philosophical
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distinctions. If the liberal paradigm of knowledge is as preva-
lent as some would argue this could not help but be the case.
Why, then, it may be asked, is it so critical for theology to
engage in serious self-reflection with respect to its precise re-
lationship to this paradigm? The reason is that the liberal
paradigm of knowledge is being dismantled by various thinkers
and writers. The failure of the liberal humanist dream, it is
argued, is essentially linked to the concept of “liberal reason.”
P. Hinlicky, for example, argues that the violence of our society
arises out of liberalism’s profound misunderstanding of human
agency. Whereas Nostbakken calls on us to protect our “per-
sonal autonomy and right to decision,” Hinlicky argues that
the anthropocentric exaltation of human agency is the ideal
left to us by the Enlightenment. By this ideal Hinlicky means,
“the reciprocally reinforcing convictions that progress is the
inevitable consequence of human agency, and that progress
consists in the ever greater amplification of human agency (or
“freedom”).” He further argues.
The modern doctrine of the human person as the autonomous,
value-creating agent of history, whether in its liberal or socialist
versions, is rightly under widespread attack, not only because of its
impossible pretensions, but because of the dawning and dreadful
recognition that this titanism is itself a parent of the entrenched
brutalities of modernity. I"!
T. Spragens also argues for a similar position:
The problem is not that men (as has often been noted) do not
in fact behave in a rational fashion; the problem is what happens
when they do behave in accordance with the im.age of recison that
arose with political liberalism or at any rate take it seriously as an
accurate account of the nature and scope of human knowledge. 1^
Violence, the quest for certainty, social unrest, intractable
philosophical and theological problems, are by this view the re-
sult of a prevalent paradigm of knowledge that has dominated
the modern period. Theological debate, then, requires a de-
flection into self-reflection before it can enter into meaningful
debate. It is hoped that this essay provides some reason for
a deferral of a new round of liberal and conservative theologi-
cal headbutting. By seeing both intellectual strands as minor
variations on a basic paradigm of knowledge the stage is set
for theology, on the one hand, to free itself from an outmoded
and destructive form of knowledge and, on the other hand, to
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generate from within a clear and coherent theological position
that will not be dismissed by society as either irrational and
hopeful or rational and hopeless.
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